In contrast, the imperative of Laissez-faire offers little guidance when it comes to the question of how 11 market processes should be framed. Mises never acknowledged this difficulty when criticizing "ordointerventionism" (Mises, quoted from Hülsmann, 2007, p. 880) .
It is important to note that the economic constitution has implications for the political system as well.
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According to Eucken, an economic constitution that prevents exploitation by private actors should be supplemented with political institutions such as the rule of law and the separation of powers that limit the oppressive power of the state (Eucken, 1952 (Eucken, /2004 .
There is, however, an important qualification to be made. The members of the Freiburg school did not expect this desirable outcome from any kind of competition, but only from what they referred to as Leistungswettbewerb ("performance-competition") . This type of competition can be distinguished from Behinderungswettbewerb ("prevention-competition") which includes all 13 competitive strategies aimed at hindering competition, such as cartels (Eucken, 1952 (Eucken, /2004 .
It is a key insight of the Freiburg school that unhampered markets are not a sufficient condition for the establishment of a functioning market economy; rather, measures are needed to assure the longterm preservation of competition. These measures include an independent competition authority as 14 the main form of controlling economic concentration (ibid, pp. 291-299) . The criterion employed to distinguish permissible from non-permissible acts of competitive behavior is that of consumer sovereignty (see Böhm, 1933) .
The Austrian perspective on these matters can be derived from Mises' discussion of cartels as "monopolistic enterprises" (Mises, 1962 (Mises, /2005 . While he acknowledges the existence and the undesirable nature of monopoly prices, it is clear that to Mises, the most prominent source of market power is the state: "Twist and turn the monopoly problem as one may, one always comes back to the fact that monopoly prices are possible only where there is control over natural resources of a particular kind or where legislative enactments and their administration create the necessary conditions for the formation of monopolies. In the unhampered development of the economy […] there is no tendency toward the exclusion of competition" (ibid, p. 67). Underlying this conviction is the idea that − without governmental protection of the producers − monopolistic market positions will attract enough competition for the market to return to equilibrium prices (ibid, p. 64). Thus, the contestability of markets solves the problem of market power over time if undisturbed "catallactic competition" prevails. In contrast to the economists of the Freiburg school, Mises assumes that 15 under a regime of Laissez-faire, private economic power rests solely in the hands of the consumers (Mises, 1949 (Mises, /1998 .
The translations are taken from Vanberg, 1998. 13 The Freiburg school shares its focus on competition policy with early representatives of the Chicago 14 school such as Henry Simons (Köhler and Kolev, 2013) . Later Chicago economists were more critical of Simon's "interventionist" agenda and questioned his standing as a classical liberal (see the emphatic defense by De Long, 1990) . Mises' dynamic perspective on competition has been developed further by his student Israel Kirzner, who 15 argues that (temporal) monopolies can be the result of "alert" entrepreneurs achieving a favorable market position before others follow their lead (Kirzner, 1973, pp. 88-134) . " 6 thought of the Freiburg school. We have also shown that these two liberalisms translate into different beliefs with respect to the problem of cartels and monopolies. With this in mind, we will now turn to a discussion of Hellwig's article as well as the ensuing exchange of letters.
The short, four pages article in question is entitled "We don't need antitrust legislation" (Hellwig, 1955A) . In this article, Hellwig emphasizes the "opposing forces" that cartels are exposed to under a regime of free competition. He explains: "To restrict competition means to reduce supply or demand, thus requiring a behavior that only rarely has a chance of success" (ibid, p. 19). Since
Hellwig views cartels as unsustainable, he believes that denying them legal protection is a sufficient solution to the problem of collusion. Active competition policy, on the other hand, constitutes an unnecessary intervention by the state. Hellwig concludes by arguing that the damages done by a competition authority will always outweigh the damages done by cartels. 16 These arguments are not by themselves surprising or overly controversial. However, the intention of Hellwig's article is to reveal the interventionist character of competition law by "testing" several aspects of it, namely the economic interests involved, the underlying theory and the foreseeable consequences (ibid, p. 16). When it comes to testing the second aspect, Hellwig invokes the proximity between the Freiburg school and national socialism. Clearly, this proximity is supposed to serve as a proof for the interventionist character of competition law. Hellwig says the following:
"The ordoliberal beliefs, especially of the Freiburg school, sail under the flag of neoliberalism.
From the perspective of the history of economic thought, the term social liberalism would be more accurate, because Oppenheimer's ideas are melded in a peculiar way with Eucken's theory of 17 economic systems. The ideas of Böhm, Eucken and Miksch on antitrust policy and on
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'Leistungswettbewerb' − one used to speak more aptly of free competition − were allowed to be published unchallenged in the series of the Academy for German Law edited by Reichsminister Dr.
In more modern terms, Hellwig anticipates a false positive or "Type I error" by the competition authority.
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On the different types of regulatory errors and the associated costs see Joskow and Klevorick (1979 that apparently these remarks have already been noticed very unpleasantly; yet I cannot avoid the impression that you yourself are not aware of how much Mr. Hellwig adopted the wrong tone and that the reputation of your publication demands that you distance yourself in the most unambiguous way from such methods of discussion".
The exchange of letters ends here. The discussion, however, manifests itself in several more articles such as a report by Mötteli (1955) in the NZZ, a series of contributions by Hellwig in the Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung (DZ, nos. 88-95) as well as the aforementioned paper by Lutz (1956).
V. The Freiburg school and national socialism
For Hellwig, pointing to the (supposed) reception of ordoliberal ideas by the Nazis mostly serves as a proof for their "illiberal" quality. However, this reception is an interesting topic in its own right.
As was hinted at in the correspondence, Eucken and Böhm were part of the German resistance movement against Hitler. They participated in drawing up a secret memorandum that outlined the political organization of Germany after Nazi rule and were arrested (Böhm) or interrogated (Eucken) following the failure of the 20 July plot (see Rieter and Schmolz, 1993 Nazism.
While it is beyond the scope of our paper to address such claims, we want to evaluate the contribution of Hellwig and Muthesius to this discussion. Their position can be summarized by a statement made by Hellwig in the letter from May 13: "The whole point is that those works were allowed to be published although the authors were frowned upon by the authorities or even
With respect to the subject of this paper, two authors deserve mention that are not part of Goldschmidt's 24 survey. Arguing from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, Robert Naumann claims that "the position of the neoliberals means the total surrender of the old liberal concept of non-intervention of the state in economic life and an affirmation of the fascist command economy" (Naumann, 1957, p. 71) . A similar conclusion is reached by Hermann Turley (1961) . For a recent discussion of this argument see Nientiedt and Köhler (2014). He goes on to declare that in a post-war world, the economic system will have to change radically in order to allow for the provision of consumer goods (ibid, pp. 30-32). However, in Eucken's opinion, the change towards a "free" market economy does not suffice; in the absence of planning, there are still tendencies towards the concentration of power (ibid, pp. 34-37). The solution to this problem is seen in the establishment of an economic constitution that upholds the rules of performance-competition (ibid, p. 38). It would require the state to withdraw from creating monopolies by legislative measures and a competition authority to exercise control over combines established by private actors (ibid, pp. 40-43). Eucken concludes by saying that only this type of economic constitution can maintain the "inalienable rights to freedom of the individual" (ibid, p.
Writing for the DZ, Hellwig suggests that "party programme, party literature, legislation and economic 26 policy of national socialism emphatically advocated the fight against cartels" (Hellwig, 1955B, p. 7) . In the following, several members of Group IV formed the "Arbeitsgemeinschaft Erwin von 27 Beckerath" (see Blumenberg-Lampe, 1973, pp. 29-54) . Their findings on the organization of a peace-time economy after Hitler were received, among others, by the oppositional Kreisau Circle (ibid, pp. 48-49). " 14 44). The contributions by Böhm and Miksch add to the subject of Eucken's chapter, elaborating on the incompatibly of central planning and competition (Böhm, 1942) and the regulation of imperfect competition (Miksch, 1942) .
When the volume was published, Röpke − writing from his exile in Switzerland − called it a "blatant denunciation of the complete fiasco of national socialist war and command economy" (Röpke, quoted from Janssen, 2012, p. 215). Hauke Janssen maintains, though, that rather than being an act of "intellectual sabotage" the ordoliberal concept of competition was not subversive as such (ibid, p. 215-216) . He lists two reasons. First, competition was not by any means opposed to national socialist ideology; the Nazis viewed competitive behavior as a selection mechanism that disposes of "weak" participants in the market. Indeed, the title of the 1942 volume points to the process of selection (Leistungsauslese). Second, the concept could have appealed to those within the party who advocated middle class friendly policies. The similarities pointed out 28 by Janssen may explain why it was possible to publish these texts at all. nearer the point at which the ruin of enterprises valuable to our national economy is threatened" (ibid, p. 266). Between 1933 and 1936, the ministry of economic affairs (RWM) oversaw the formation of 1600 voluntary cartels and imposed another 120 compulsory agreements (Tooze, 2007, p. 108) .
All pretense of maintaining a market economy was abandoned with the enactment of the Four-year plan in 1936 that was aimed at increasing productive capacity in preparation for the war. Even without the nationalization of industry, the Nazi state managed to seize control of the manufacturing process. Adam Tooze (2007) describes the mechanism by which this was done. A central role was assigned to the Business Groups (Wirtschaftsgruppen), compulsory associations that acted as a channel between businesses and the RWM. Political objectives were communicated to the Groups, who were then responsible for implementing them. From 1936 onward, the Groups were also in charge of overseeing the cartels (ibid, p. 107-108) . Thus, in the Nazi economy, industrial concentration became a means for the authorities to conduct their variant of collectivist economic planning. Competition, on the other hand, was reduced to the struggle of firms to obtain procurement contracts from the bureaucracy.
It should have become clear that the actual economic policy of national socialism − mostly characterized by planning − stands in stark contrast to Eucken's concept of a competitive order.
While the instruments of planning must be seen first and foremost as a necessity of Germany's war preparations, Janssen argues that speculations on a peacetime economic system of national socialism are counterfactual. Since war can be considered the logical consequence of national 29 socialist ideology, so can the tendency towards a command economy (Janssen, 2012, p. 525) .
Given these considerations, how can we explain Hellwig's remarks on the reception of ordoliberal thought by the Nazis? We have already pointed to the theoretical differences between the Austrian and the ordoliberal variant of liberalism. But there is an additional explanatory approach. Hellwig's remarks may be explained by his personal acquaintance with Miksch rather than Eucken or Böhm.
According to Hellwig, Miksch never disputed that the Nazis liked the concept of performancecompetition. However, the letter from May 13 also contains a passage in which Hellwig recollects
There has been some discussion on whether the Nazis were anticipating a peacetime economic system that 29 would allow for more economic freedom of the entrepreneur, a scenario in which the forced cartelization and other elements of the war economy could possibly have been abolished (see Herbst, 1982, pp. 144-147 
VI. Conclusion
It was a German-born American economist, Henry Wallich, who was among the first to note the role of the Freiburg ordoliberals as adversaries of the Third Reich. In his book on Germany's postwar economic recovery, Wallich remarks: "During the Nazi period the [Freiburg] school represented a kind of intellectual resistance movement, requiring great personal courage as well as independence of mind" (Wallich, 1955, p. 114) . Since the 1950s, this assessment has been commented upon and confirmed in many respects. Hellwig und Muthesius, however, have little to add to this literature; they fail to demonstrate that the Nazis were actually sympathetic to the ordoliberal concept of competition.
But the controversy outlined in this paper is not really concerned with history. Germany's political In the above discussed exchange of letters, the Austrian group − represented by Hayek, Hellwig, Mises and Muthesius − can be credited with having anticipated important arguments on the dynamic nature of markets and competition. Modern thinkers arguing in the ordoliberal tradition would probably be more careful in assessing the dangers of private economic power (Vanberg,
